An Apophatic Diagnosis

A Matter About One's Selfhood

It is not uncommon for the multitude to conflate my approach with what is commonly referred to as journaling. The difference between journaling and the type of philosophising that I do is difficult to demonstrate. For the former deals with one's personal life and the latter is a matter about one's selfhood. It is unclear whether I must justify the difference, in itself, to the other. However, it is, at once, a confession of the limitation of my knowledge and an avenue necessitating exploration. 

I keep writing. 

I write and continue to write across different tools and devices, mediums and formats, as well as purposes and functions. My modality oscillating and vacillating through narration, exploration, description, and analysis. Earlier on, admittedly, my sense of, or the lack thereof, the audience weighed heavily upon me. 

Evidently, I did not figure this out solely by myself. I seldom do. Michael Hannon reminds me that this is, in itself, a human condition, to derive the lion's share of information from others, as they're often in better position to know more truths that we are. If I am to be a human being, then, I must, as Hannon reminds me, recognise that '[we] are information-dependent creatures that often rely on the testimony of others.’

For many years my attempt at philosophising stayed parallel to a rather implicit urge to popularise it. This urge was driven by a desire to be known, a thirst for social approval, contemporary economic aspirations, and so on. This implicit urge did not necessarily depart but rather transmuted in a particular manner. It eventually became driven towards socio-academic as well as institutional approval. 

This urge does not hold the same sway anymore. 

A Taxonomy of Perceived Notions

This is partly due to the responses as well as nature of responses received thus far. Let's venture an exploration of the taxonomy of perceived notions about philosophy held by the multitude interfaced. It seems that the multitude holds a variety of notions about philosophy. The first and the most common one seems to be about a certain impracticality of philosophy. Typically, a harsh demarcation is implicitly drawn between the problems of one's practical life and a "philosophy" that the multitude is most likely to come across. The quotations serve to indicate that this philosophy is something I consider expedient, performative, superficial, and, above all, commodified. 

Whilst this commodification presents itself varyingly, two ways are noteworthy and distinctive. First, through the commodification of the self and, second, through the commodification of practice. The former demands that one be many things, many roles, across contexts, and time. The latter, coupled and otherwise, incentivises some and, through leveraging a post-resentiment, castigates others from doing anything else. The synthesis of modernism with digitalisation underlies the modern individual, like a treadmill. Another notion at play is one's perception of philosophy as situated within some combination of elitism, privilege, and vanity. The view that "philosophy" is conducted by the elite, divorced from the ordinary reality, or by those divorced and privileged from one's ordinary reality, who now consider themselves elite, or by the vainglorious among us exercising their will-to-grandiosity. For these subscribers, "stating and doing philosophy" is then the first sign of said chasm between themselves, living an ordinary life and others, that aren't. 

This variety notwithstanding, each notion seems inherently, if not incorrect then, a terrible misdiagnosis. If it is expedient, then it seems likely to be about about some implicit or hidden attainment yet undisclosed. If it is performative, then it is inherently social. Perhaps activated by environmental conditions or an internalised imaginary, or both. If it is superficial, at best it is a beginning, at worst it would seldom withstand any basic scrutiny. If it is commodified, then it is perhaps more accurately a product, not a practice. If it is accessible solely by the elite, it is, then, but power masquerading as something else. If it is independent of ordinary reality, by the virtue of lacking any socio-cultural, historical, a contemporary necessity, it disqualifies itself. 

Beyond this commonly and loosely held view, are three views that stand distinct. At the first mention of terms such as philosophy, Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Geworfenheit, and others, my wife cannot but help herself from falling asleep. 

Her interest wanes almost instantaneously. 

Her attention ever so fleeting. 

Her questions, non-existent. 

Whilst she engages, partly, as a function of propriety, for the most part it is as a function of an internal imperative to be a decent partner. Undoubtedly, I seldom hold this against her. I cannot help myself from speaking of these recondite matters, she cannot help take interest, and I have made this clear, nor does she have to. It must be stated, that in ways more than one, my wife continues to be a better person than I could ever be. However, as a function of this, I've come to realise that affinity within and towards philosophy is not contingent on one's intellect. 

Another individual, we'll call them B, stands distinct to the multitude, in their orientation towards philosophy. 

Their engagement, evident. 

Their enthusiasm, undeniable. 

Their idiosyncratic concern, present. 

Alas, I can sense but the presence, for the particular essence remains undisclosed. In like manner, the overlap between their sphere of personal concern and mine remains obscure as well. I suppose, the disclosure of this overlap falls beyond my sphere. 

Here's another, let's call them IK. Dissimilar to my wife but similar to B, their particular essence remains undisclosed. Unlike mine, their orientation seems clearly defined. Whether this delineation brings with it demarcation remains to be seen. And again in like manner, the overlap between their sphere of personal concern and mine remains obscure. Indeed, unlike the multitude, IK does orient towards philosophy. However, that this orientation continues to be contingent on some multitude, serves to discomfort me.

A Non-immune Diagnose

Austin distinguished his ideas for their peculiar truth rather than their intensity or their capacity to evoke. Mehta believed that his ideas would remain continually subject to revision, if they were to have the possibility of improvement. Likewise, it remains difficult to shake the provisional nature of my utterances as well as lend them certitude. Harbour no doubt, and at the risk of repeating myself, that, both, the aforementioned as well as words to follow are but my notions of things is not lost on me. Insofar as I am able to castigate the common view as a misdiagnosis, I am unable to immunise my own from a scrutiny borne of similar nature.

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Bibliography

Austin, J. L. (1962). How to do things with words. Harvard University Press.

Butler, J. (2005). Giving an account of oneself. Fordham University Press. https://amzn.to/43wGhhh

Epictetus. (2008). Discourses and selected writings (R. Hard, Trans.). Penguin Classics.

Hannon, M. (2019). What’s the point of knowledge? Oxford University Press.

Hannon, M., & Nguyen, C. T. (2021). Understanding philosophy: Theoretical and practical approaches. Routledge.

Heidegger, M. (2008). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Harper Perennial Modern Thought. (Original work published 1927) https://amzn.to/44I9s38

Kierkegaard, S. (1989). The sickness unto death (A. Hannay, Trans.). Penguin Classics. (Original work published 1849) https://amzn.to/3YRnEmH

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Mehta, N. (2014). A writing guide for professional philosophers. Philosophical Papers, 43(3), 353–368. https://philarchive.org/rec/MEHAWG

Seneca. (1969). Letters from a stoic (R. Campbell, Trans.). Penguin Classics.

Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations (G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans.). Blackwell Publishing. https://amzn.to/4kPr8Ph