Marked for Doubt

Having nowhere better to begin, I retreated inwards and backwards. The idea seemed simple enough. To retrieve markings made previously and begin by examining the condition of their selection, engage in a reconsideration, and respond from my current temporality.

In this instance, Marcus Aurelius' meditation seems like the straightforward choice. In part because the book has many markings, and partly because a consideration of some sort has been long due. It now occurs that perhaps collating all ideas, that have had a somewhat profound impact on either life or even memory, is a decent idea. Alas, this remains better reserved for posterity. The period between this piece and when the markings were made is quite a lengthy one. Indeed, even back then the principal method of selection was contingent on (some) internal measure. My sole bother, however, remains that in those days my exercise of philosophy failed to remark about the condition and criteria of selection. I must go further and, perhaps, castigate my former self, for his exercise of philosophy could hardly be excused as an exercise of philosophy. This criticism is not without some basis. For, if not for The Event and the subsequent Autoethnography, the former exercise would have continued. I find and continue to find this deeply concerning.

But I digress.

This Method

There were two sets of marking, namely blue, to denote general marking, and pink, to denote particular peculiar ones. For the purpose of this piece, I'll confine myself to the latter ones. More remarks begin with a retrospective speculation.

The Markings

Practice even when you have despaired of mastering. For lack of practice the left hand is awkward for most tasks, but has a stronger grip on the bridle than the right - it is practised in this.

It was one of my views, the idea of specialisation, that each individual has a particular part to play within a wider or broader ontological reality. Back then, this idea suggested, both, the refinement and training of the components that made up one's particular practice and one's particular practice within some wider schema of things. At this moment, this stage of my epistemic endeavour remains assuredly in despair following the Event. Back then, being awkward deterred me greatly, be it during the process of writing or upon reflecting on the product of my writing. Inasmuch as I did not want any of it, I did not want to be awkward or for it to be awkward. It is not the case that I have moved beyond writing awkwardly. It is, also, not the case that I have accepted my awkward writing. But rather, it is my belief, that that which I call awkward, whether it is or not, contingent as it remains on the other, is but me.

Whether it could be better, makes no difference.

Whether it could be different, is a matter of indifference to me.

As long as the words written are truly mine and mine truly, my sole concern is gratified.

A concern remains, which is that the expression of these "words" must be predicated upon the narrowly defined and particularly demarcated conditions and criteria, over which I alone preside as the final arbiter. In writing and reading you must learn before you can teach. Yet more so in life. For certainly, I knew this back then, marking it but as a exercise in marking that which I already knew. Years later, now, I can acknowledge the insufficiency of my knowledge. Following the Event, much of my epistemic certitude remains unmoored. This detachment notwithstanding, the affinity to this marking persists.

Epictetus used to say that when you kiss your child you should say to yourself: 'Tomorrow you may be dead.' But these are ominous words! 'No,' he replies, ' nothing is ominous which points to a natural process. Otherwise it would be ominous to speak of the corn being reaped.

Undoubtedly, I had an incredibly different sense of the instrument at my disposal. And yet it was this instrument that utilised for the markings. This was, then, viewed as a truism. Whether I derived utility then or whether there was any utility contextually present would be difficult to investigate at this particular phase of writing. Today, however, things are relative more clear by virtue of immediacy and temporal proximity. Seemingly somewhat, but within this one should or could be able to discern my sentiment of RCO. Evidently and indeed, it is from spaces and expressions within his writing that my sense of RCO first emerged.

This too is a counter to pretension, that you have lost now the chance to live your whole life, or at least your adult life, as a philosopher: indeed it has become clear to many, yourself included, that you are far from philosophy. You are tarnished, then: difficult for you now to win the reputation of a philosopher, and besides your station in life is a contrary pull. So if you have a true perception of how things lie, abandon any concern for reputation, and be satisfied if you can just live the rest of your life, whatever remains, in the way your nature wishes. You must consider, then, what those wishes are, and then let nothing else distract you. You know from experience that in all your wanderings you have nowhere found the good life - not in logic, not in wealth, not in glory, not in indulgence: nowhere. Where then is it to be found? In doing what man's nature requires. And how is he to do this? By having principles to govern his impulses and actions. What are these principles? Those of good and evil - the belief that nothing is good for a human being which does not make him just, self-controlled, brave, and free: and nothing evil which does not make him the opposite of these.

It must be that I thought to myself of having wasted time not being a philosopher or, at the very least, not trying to pursue or situation myself with philosophy, when I could easily have. Not only would that imply that there remained some sense of agency but simultaneously a continual move to deny my duty. It seems to be the case that the sentiment felt around the cusp of transition from denial to determination remains easily retrievable; I still remember that feeling albeit differently now given my current orientation. Indeed, his words held true: [I was and, perhaps, am] far from philosophy. Indeed, his castigation continues to echo and compel: [I must and, I hope, I have] abandon[ed] any concern for reputation. For as I have said and continue to say elsewhere that the perceived expectation from the other has been an instrumental deterrent Evidently, Marcus maintains that one must remain content with living the remainder of their life in accordance with the stirrings of their nature. Upon consideration and reconsiderations it now seems not untrue that that is the pursuit of that which resembles that which I call philosophy (An Apophatic Diagnosis).

Indeed, I am somewhat grounded to attest that the good life, and here I take ‘good’ to be that narrowly, affectually, and apophatically defined idea of philosophy, was not situated ‘in logic, in wealth, [certainly] not in glory, [and definitely] not in indulgence’. Somehow and somewhat, my concern remains but must be recalled here. Another opportunity of definition, for the question ‘What are these principles’ is closely linked to the foremost concern. Whenever you meet someone, ask yourself first this immediate question:

What beliefs does this person hold about the good and bad in life?' Because if he believes this or that about pleasure and pain and their constituents, about fame and obscurity, death and life, then I shall not find it surprising or strange if he acts in this or that way, and I shall remember that he has no choice but to act as he does.Whenever you meet someone, ask yourself first this immediate question: What beliefs does this person hold about the good and bad in life?' Because if he believes this or that about pleasure and pain and their constituents, about fame and obscurity, death and life, then I shall not find it surprising or strange if he acts in this or that way, and I shall remember that he has no choice but to act as he does. It would be absurd to be surprised at a fig-tree bearing figs. Remember that there is as little cause for surprise if the world brings forth fruits such as these when the crop is there. Equally absurd for a doctor or ship's captain to be surprised at fever in a patient or a head-wind springing up.

Back then, this made perfect sense to me.

And it is not the case that that is not true anymore, but rather the "recognition" of this insight failed to produce any discernible, practical, visible, or, even, corresponding change in my life, behaviour, or general attitude. The "recognition" inasmuch as it cognitive, remained within cognition. How do I feel about this, and what do I think about it now? Admittedly, the need to gauge the character of the other was in the service of an implicit urge to guide the presentation and performance of one's self. And whilst the exercise to gauge the other is perhaps not the most futile one, my current trajectory seems to be towards a radical dispassion towards the other. It would be somewhat inexact to presume that this is some function of either apathy or disdain; it is but a matter of the selection or, more suitably, the re-selection, as it were, of the locus.

For, perhaps, it was never about the individuals but my issue with their expressions, their impressions, their ideas, and so on.

For, perhaps, this issue was merely positional, truly about my situatedness above anything else.

And for, certainly, I remained utterly opaque to this back then.

Alas, whether that holds true today is for posterity to examine.

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Bibliography

Butler, J. (2005). Giving an account of oneself. Fordham University Press. https://amzn.to/43wGhhh

Marcus Aurelius. (2006). Meditations (M. Hammond, Trans.). Penguin Classics.

Roberts, Peter. “Learning to Live with Doubt.” London Review of Education, 15(2), 2017. A reflective analysis on embracing uncertainty in educational and philosophical contexts. Available at: Learning to Live with Doubt.